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Beyond Condorcet: Optimal Aggregation Rules 





The difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it 
requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a 
method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with 
known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters 
vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by 
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1. Introduction 
In Condorcet’s (1785) paradigm of voting, some "correct" collective decision is 
presumed to exist, and some information regarding voters' skills at making that 
decision is assumed to be known. In this context, each individual voter is typically 
assigned a probability that represents his ability of making a correct decision (see, for 
example, Young (1988), (1995), (1996)). Given such probability assignments, we can 
compute the probability that some judgment aggregation rule (such as a majority rule) 
will actually yield the correct decision. In fact, given such probability assignments, 
the optimal aggregation rule can be identified (Nitzan and Paroush (1982), Shapley 
and Grofman (1984),  Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997)).  
Unfortunately, however, we generally do not have a firm foundation for 
estimating a voter’s probability of making a correct decision. Even if a historical 
record of voters’ individual decisions is available, we generally lack a definition of 
ground truth regarding the decided issues against which each voter’s record could be 
compared. Some empirical attempts have thus been made to estimate voters' skills in 
medical and legal contexts, by comparing voter decisions to some exogenous proxy of 
the 'truth' (see, for example, Chapter 10 in Nitzan and Paroush (1985) and Karotkin 
(1994)). Such estimates of individual skills are, however, typically not sufficiently 
reliable for the purpose of determining an optimal aggregation rule. 
  A slightly more sophisticated estimation method has been proposed by 
Grofman and Feld (1983), an application of which to EU council voting has been 
considered by Nurmi (2002). They suggest to estimate a voter's decisional capability 
by the extent that his observed past decisions align with those of the majority. In other 
words, in this method the majority decision is considered as a plausible endogenous 
proxy for the 'truth'. This method is very interesting in that it anticipates the idea that   3
voters' decisional skills can be somehow estimated using the track record of their 
decisions, even in the absence of knowledge of ground truth regarding those 
decisions.  
In this paper, we show how this method can be generalized and optimized. To 
understand the sub-optimality of their method, notice that it can lead to internal 
inconsistency. A simplistic application of the method presumes the correctness of an 
outcome determined by simple majority rule (SMR) and assigns weights to voters 
accordingly. In turn, these assigned weights lead to a different outcome than has 
already been presumed, which might lead to different assigned weights. In this sense, 
the estimation procedure is usually inconsistent or 'unstable'; re-application of the 
estimation procedure yields different outcomes and, in turn, different estimation of 
voters' decisional skills.  
This study considers the setting in which we have a track record of voters’ 
individual decisions, but no given ground truth for the issues on which they voted. 
There are many real-world examples of repeated votes, in which competency varies 
among voters but remains invariant per voter, for which this framework is applicable. 
First, there are periodically repeated committee decisions regarding, for example, 
whether to change interest rates. Similar examples can be taken from the capital 
markets, court votes, medical expert decisions, firm theory (repeated decisions 
concerning quantity and prices), and more. Second, there are cases in which 
committee members are asked to vote on a range of similar but independent 
propositions. This has become quite common on the Internet, where site visitors are 
asked to offer judgments regarding repetitive tasks such as image tagging, expert 
identification and a variety of other tasks (hundreds of examples of which can be 
found, for example, at Amazon’s Mechanical Turk site).   4
We provide an algorithm for finding consistent or “stable” evaluation of 
voters' skills – what we call skill-evaluation equilibrium – that ensures the assignment 
of optimal weights to the voters. Such consistency guarantees therefore the 
simultaneous fulfillment of the two necessary requirements an optimal skill-based 
aggregation rule should satisfy: estimating skills and aggregating accordingly.  More 
specifically, we propose an iterative mechanism that allows skill evaluation based on 
repeated re-evaluation of the optimal voting outcomes. Any new such set of voting 
outcomes yields a new skill evaluation; it turns out that the simultaneous evaluation of 
skills and optimal outcomes converges, thus yielding internally consistent, stable 
skill-evaluation equilibrium, in which neither the outcomes nor the evaluated skills 
need to be changed. This unique property implies the attainment of optimal collective 
decision making as well as consistent, maximum-likelihood skill estimation.  
The optimal weights assigned to the voters could, in principle, be equal, but 
they generally will not be. In the unlikely situation that they turn out to be equal, the 
applied rule is just the common SMR. By definition, the proposed optimal and 
consistent skill-based procedure outperforms any aggregation rule and, in particular, 
SMR, for any given number of voters, decision-making record and distribution of 
skills. In exhaustive experiments using simulated data, we demonstrate that the 
optimal procedure is substantially superior to SMR, under almost symmetric (uniform 
or normal), minimally competent skill distribution that allows unskilled decision 
makers. In fact, given sufficiently large voting records, the collective probability of 
making a correct choice converges to 1, even under conditions in which SMR achieves 
a correct decision with probability of about 0.7. 
It is instructive to compare this result with that of Condorcet (1785). The main 
concern of Condorcet focused on the implications of 'equality' among voters for   5
determining the socially most desirable aggregation rule, where voter equality is 
understood both in terms of assignment of equal voting rights and in terms of 
assignment of equal decisional skills. This main concern resulted in the celebrated 
Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) (Black (1958)). The theorem has two parts. The first 
part establishes the superiority of SMR over individual decision-making (the 'expert 
rule'), provided that voter skills are sufficiently competent and homogeneous, 
Condorcet (1785), Nitzan and Paroush (1982, 1985). (This result was subsequently 
extended to the case where there is uncertainty regarding individual decisional skills 
(Ben Yashar and Paroush (2000), Berend and Sapir (2005), Nitzan and Paroush 
(1985).) The second part establishes that SMR converges to a probability of 1 of 
making the correct decision as the number of voters grows, provided that the voters 
are sufficiently competent, individually or on average (Condorcet (1785), Grofman, 
Owen and Feld (1983), Owen, Grofman and Feld (1986), Berend and Paroush (1998), 
Paroush (1998)). Condorcet and his more recent followers do not take advantage of 
skill heterogeneity among the group members or of the track record of their decisions. 
In contrast, the optimality of our proposed aggregation rule is obtained by exploiting 
the diversity among group members that emerges from the track record of their 
decisions. Our work goes beyond Condorcet in the sense that we show how to obtain 
optimal decision-making without restrictive assumptions such as sufficiently high 
decision-making quality, skill homogeneity or existence of a sufficiently large group 
of decision makers. Instead, we assume only that a sufficient track record for voters' 
decisions is available, which can be exploited to optimally estimate their decisional 
skills and, in turn, optimally assign their decision-making weights, even in the 
absence of any knowledge of ground truth. We do in fact make one very weak 
assumption regarding voters’ skills, namely, that a unanimous decision is correct with   6
probability greater than 0.5. This is a far weaker assumption regarding voters’ skills 
than required for CJT. 
Voter equality as implicit in SMR is justified in situations where decisional 
skills are all of sufficient quality and homogeneity. In this case, a sufficiently large 
number of voters results in convergence to the maximal collective performance. In 
contrast, optimal decision-making that is based on our proposed voting procedure is 
always warranted, deriving its superiority from its ability to identify skills through 
learning from experience. The merit of this procedure and its advantage over SMR are 
especially high when skills are sufficiently spread out and the track record of 
individual decisions is sufficiently abundant. 
The next section describes our setting, presents the proposed judgment 
aggregation rule and results establishing that this skill-based rule is consistent and 
optimal. In the following three sections, we use simulated data to demonstrate the 
superiority of our approach over SMR and one other baseline method, relating the 
results to a variety of parameters: the number of decision makers (whom, for 
convenience, we call voters), the number of issues with respect to which decisions 
have been made and the form of the distribution of individual decisional skills. 
Further implications, possible applications and possible extensions of the results are 
discussed in the concluding Section 6. 
 
2. An Algorithm for Optimal Judgment Aggregation 
In this section we present our algorithm. The discussion here follows that of our 
companion paper (Baharad et al 2010), which deals with the algorithm’s convergence 
properties.    7
Let N={1,…,n}, n ≥ 3, denote a finite set of voters and let M denote a set of m 
distinct binary issues, m ≥ 2. The judgment of voter i∈N over issue j∈M, is denoted 
by  j i a . Unlike preferences, judgments are binary; thus, } 1 , 0 { ∈ j i a .  a  denotes the 
entire set of judgments  } { ij a . The rows and columns of the matrix are associated, 
respectively, with voters and issues. Hence, a column  j a  in the matrix a is the 
judgments profile on issue  j ; similarly, a row ai is the judgment profile of voter i. We 
assume that the issues are independent of each other (so that the problem of 
inconsistent aggregation across issues (List and Petit 2002) does not arise here) and 
that each issue has some (unknown) "correct" resolution, denoted by  j t . In addition, 
each voter i is associated with an unknown probability  i p  of making the correct 
decision. This somewhat simplified assumption assigns a probability to a voter, and 
not to the combination of voter-issue. It supports an implicit assumption, according to 
which a voter can be referred to as having some fixed reliability level in a field (that is 
a set of issues under a common topic), and not only on a specific issue. The set of 
individual probabilities  } { i p is denoted by θ . For simplicity, we assume that, in the 
absence of any information, the two possible resolutions of an issue are equally likely; 
that is, for every j, the prior probability p(tj = 1) = ½. 
A  judgment aggregation rule  V is a mapping from the set of individual 
judgments a = {aij} to a set of binary decisions in {0,1}
m. Our objective is to find an 
optimal judgment aggregation rule, given no information other than the set of 
judgments a = {aij}.  
The suggested framework does not assume that the individual skills, {pi}, and 
the correct resolution for each issue are (ex-ante) known; hence, one might wonder in 
what sense a decision method could be optimal. In principle, given  } { i p = θ  and {p(tj   8
= 1)}, we could compute the conditional probability of obtaining the set of judgments 
a. Thus, given some set of judgments a, optimality is obtained by the values of θ  and 
{p(tj = 1)} that maximize the probability of a. As shown below, the values {p(tj = 1)} 
can be determined from a and  θ . Thus, denoting by  ) ; ( θ a p  the probability of a 
given the parameters  θ , our objective is to maximize  ) ; ( θ a p .  The suggested 
iterative approach for finding this maximum is based on some initial estimate of  i p . 
These values are re-used to compute, for each issue j, the probability that  1 = j t . 
Moreover, once all the conditional resolution probabilities  ) | 1 ( a t p j =  are given, one 
is able to compute, for each decision maker i, the most likely value of  i p . This 
(temporarily) most likely value of  i p  is referred to as 
′
i p  and  } { '
'
i p = θ  is said to be 
induced from  }) | 1 ( { a t p j = . The iterative procedure is incomplete so long as  θ θ ′ ≠ , 
i.e. 
′ ≠ i i p p  for at least one decision maker. The procedure is complete when  θ θ ′ = , 
i.e. for all i, 
′
i p = i p ; at this stage a skill-evaluation equilibrium is obtained. 
To summarize, we have the following hill-climbing procedure,Q, for finding a 
skill-evaluation equilibrium: 
1)  Choose some initial θ .  
2)  Using the current θ , compute  ) | 1 ( a t p j =  for each  m j ,..., 1 = . 
3)  Replace θ  with the induced  ' θ . 
4)  Repeat until convergence. 
 
It remains only to show how  ) | 1 ( a t p j =  is obtained given } { i p = θ , and how 
the maximum-likelihood values of  } { i p = θ  are computed, given  )} | 1 ( { a t p j = .   9
First, to compute  ) | 1 ( a t p j = , recall that the prior probability p(tj = 1) = ½. 
Thus, Bayes' rule implies that  = = = = ) | 1 ( ) | 1 ( j j j a t p a t p  
(| 1 )( 1 ) (| 1 )
(1)
(| 1 )( 1 ) (| 0 )( 0 ) (| 1 ) (| 0 )
jj j jj
jj j jj j jj jj
pa t pt pa t
pa t pt pa t pt pa t pa t
=⋅ = =
=
=⋅ =+ =⋅ = =+ =
 
where  j a  is the judgment profile on issue j . This can easily be computed by 
substituting  
0 1
( | 1) ( | 1) (1 ) (2)
ij ij
jj i jj i i
a ia
pa t pa t p p
= =
== == − ∏ ∏∏  
and  
1 0
( | 0) ( | 0) (1 )
ij ij
jj i jj i i
a ia
p at p at p p
= =
== == − ∏ ∏∏  
Given the values  )} | 1 ( { a t p j = , they can be compared to the judgments of 
individual i, in order to compute the maximum-likelihood values of  } {
′ = ′ i p θ . 
Specifically, the maximum likelihood value of pi is equal to the average (over j) 
probability that aij = tj. Thus,  
|) ) | 1 ( | 1 (
1








j i a a t p
m




− = − = = + = = ∑ ∑ ∑
= =
                                                                                                                           
The procedure Q is a special case of the well-known EM algorithm (Dempster 
et al. 1977). Thus, it can be shown (Baharad et al (2010)) that this procedure 
converges to a skill-evaluation equilibrium, and almost always converges to a local 
maximum.  
In the following sections, we will show empirically that, for properly chosen 
initial values, the local maximum to which Q converges is usually a global maximum. 
It should be noted, however, that there are skill-evaluation equilibria that are not local 
maxima. For example, the probability set  5 . 0 = i p , for all i, is an equilibrium that is   10
not a local maximum. Such problematic sets are rare and should not to be chosen as 
initial values.  
Note that we do make a minimal assumption regarding voters' competency, in 
the sense that if voters are unanimous on some issue, then their vote is correct with 
probability greater than ½. More formally, we assume that ∏ ∏ − >
ii
i i p p 1.   
The procedure converges for θ  as well as for  )} | 1 ( { a t p j = . While the 
procedure does not technically entail a final aggregation rule, one naturally follows 
from the procedure. For an aggregation rule V, let Vj(a) ∈ {0,1} be the decision of V 
for issue j, and let Vj(a) = 1 if and only if the obtained  ) | 1 ( a t p j = > 0.5. It is now 
shown that this aggregation rule satisfies an optimality condition that is well known in 
the voting literature. 
An aggregation rule V is linear, if there exist weights wi and constant c such 
that, for every j, V(aj) = 1 if and only if   c a w
n
i
ij i ≥ ∑
=1
. By the main result in Nitzan 
and Paroush (1982) and Shapley and Grofman (1984), if voter skills {} i p  are known, 
a linear aggregation rule is optimal, that is, yields the maximal collective probability 
of making the correct decision, if wi = log(pi/1-pi).  
It should be noted that the judgment aggregation rule V implied by procedure 
Q is an optimal linear aggregation rule. From equations (1) and (2) above, it follows 
that  
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log(    11
The last inequality is precisely the one required by the definition of optimality for 
linear aggregation rules. 
It should be noted that although the estimation of decisional skills is based on 
complete information regarding the judgments of all n individuals on all m issues, our 
method is applicable even when voter records are incomplete, that is, when some 
voter’s decision on some issues are not available. All steps in the algorithm can be 
carried out using partial information. Thus, in particular, the method can be applied in 
cases where voters are allowed to abstain.  
We add one note on strategic voting in this context. Our setting assumes a 
common interest among voters to arrive at the truth. Such common interest would 
hopefully reduce a voter’s temptation to vote strategically in order to maximize his 
own weight. The voters' best interest is, after all, to assign the correct weights to every 
voter, in order to reach the correct decision. The question of strategic voting, when 
voters are solely concerned by the common collective interest, was recently examined 
by Ben-Yashar and Milchtaich (2007). They established that under the 'first best' 
voting rule, the decision makers do not have an incentive to vote strategically and 
non-informatively. Fortunately, our setting proposes a mechanism that results in the 
use of the 'first best' voting rule and is therefore immune to strategic non-informative 
voting. Such strategy-proofness does not hold under 'second best' anonymous 
aggregation rules, as have been demonstrated by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), 
Ben-Yashar and Milchtaich (2007), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and McLennan 
(1998). In fact, in this setting, effective deliberation prior to the vote is expected to 
take place, as established in Coughlan (2000). That is, every member of the group has 
an incentive to truthfully reveal his private information and then all group members 
unanimously vote for the collectively best alternative.    12
 
3. Simulation Design 
As we noted above, for appropriate initialization, the Q procedure converges to a 
locally maximal skill-evaluation equilibrium and it implies a linear aggregation rule 
that is optimal for that skill evaluation. In this section, we outline our simulation 
method and in the following two sections, we will show that this equilibrium typically 
yields a global maximum of the probability function  ) ; ( θ a p , as borne out by a range 
of empirical experiments. 
To test the effectiveness of the proposed method relative to some baseline 
methods, we apply simulated scenarios. In each simulation, for each j , the "correct" 
value  j t  associated with issue j is randomly sampled using a fair coin mechanism. 
The voters' skills parameters {pi} are sampled according to some distribution, as will 
be specified in context.  
For every voter i and issue j  we generate the vote  j ij t a =  if  1 = ij k  and 
j ij t a − =1  if  0 = ij k , where  ij k  is the result of a coin toss with a probability i p  for a 
"1" result. The object of our algorithms is to find  j t , given the values  ij a . Our first 
baseline is SMR the application of which does not require the estimation of the voters' 
decisional skills. A more sophisticated baseline is a weighted majority rule where the 
optimal weight of voter i is obtained by estimating i p  as the proportion of issues for 
which  ij a  coincides with the majority vote. Formally, let j x ˆ  denote the majority of 
votes over  ) ,..., ( 1 nj j a a , for j = 1,...,m. Then the estimated i p  is  | } ˆ | { | ˆ 1
j ij m i x a j p = =  
for i = 1,...,n. We refer to this latter method, which is proposed in Grofman and Feld 
(1983), as GF. Finally, we use the procedure Q, with  i p  initialized as in the second 
baseline. (Other initializations are possible; for example, every voter could be initially   13
assigned some fixed  2
1 > i p . The results for such alternative initializations are not 
substantially different than those reported below.) When the decisional skills 
estimated by the procedure Q imply convergence to a value of  ) | 1 ( a t p j = greater 
than ½, the collective decision is assumed to be tj = 1. In this case, the optimal rule is 
the weighted majority rule corresponding to the decisional skills estimated by the 
procedure Q. For the sake of completeness, we also present the results for the optimal 
rule where the actual values of {pi} are known. This represents the upper bound on 
the accuracy that can be achieved on the basis of approximated values of {pi}.  
The methods can be evaluated by comparing the true value of tj to the value 
provided by each algorithm; for a given matrix a, we measure the proportion of 
correct tj values determined by each algorithm. Below, we compare the algorithms on 
a single example for illustrative purposes. In the following two sections, we consider 
systematically generated simulations under varying assumptions regarding voter 
competence. In each case, we will see that Q significantly outperforms both GF and 
SMR.  
For clarity, let’s consider a simple example. Suppose that there are five voters 
whose true decisional skills are given by  0.92   0.20,    0.92,   0.54,   0.46, = t θ and ten 
issues for each of which the correct result is 1. (This is for expositional simplicity and 
implies no loss of generality.) Using the above-described coin toss method, we 
generate a  10 5× vote matrix {aij} as shown in Table 1. The likelihood of voters with 
skills  t θ  voting precisely as indicated in this matrix is 2
-33.8.  
 
   14
          1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1 
          ---------------------------------------- 
(0.46)   0   0   1   0   1   1   1   1   0   0 
(0.54)   1   1   1   0   1   0   1   0   0   1 
(0.92)   1   0   1   1   1   1   1   0   1   1 
(0.20)   0   0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0 
(0.92)   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1 
 
Table 1. The entries in the  10 5× matrix {aij} represent the vote of voter i on issue j. The 
uppermost row represents the correct results for the issues and the leftmost column represents 
the voters’ respective skills. 
 
We are given only the matrix {aij} and our challenge is to find the correct 
result for each issue. Note first that SMR yields the outcome vector 
(1,0,1,0,1,1,1,0,0,1), which is correct for only 6 of 10 issues. The GF algorithm 
assigns decisional skills to the voters by comparing their respective votes to the 
majority vote. This yields the respective vector of skills  0.6   0.5,   0.8,   0.8,   0.7, = I θ . 
Now, computing for j = 1,…,10 the probability that tj = 1, we obtain the vector  
= = =
10
1 )} | 1 ( { j I j t p θ 0.91   0.39,   0.18,   0.98,   0.78,   0.98,   0.39,   0.98,   0.39,   0.91, . 
Using 0.5 as a cutoff, the GF method yields the identical vector of outcomes as SMR; 
it is thus correct for only 6 of 10 issues. Note that the likelihood of voters with skills 
I θ  voting precisely as indicated in the matrix {aij} is 2
-39.8.   
Finally, we apply the Q procedure. The 
10
1 )} | 1 ( { = = j I j t p θ  vector is used to 
update the skills vector and, in turn, the updated vector of decisional skills is used to 
update the probabilities, for j = 1,…,10, that tj = 1. Ultimately, the procedure 
converges to the skill-evaluation equilibrium  0.91   0.18,   0.83,   0.65,   0.45, * = θ , 
which, in turn, yields the vector   15
= = =
10
1 *)} | 1 ( { j j t p θ 0.99   0.99,   0.81,   0.99,   0.99,   0.94,   0.99,   0.99,   0.95,   0.99, . Thus, the 
Q procedure gives the correct result for all ten issues. Moreover, the likelihood of 
voters with skills  * θ  voting precisely as indicated in the matrix {aij} is 2
-32.9, which is 
actually greater than that of the true skills  t θ . 
 
4. Simulation Results: Near-Symmetric Skill Distributions 
In our first set of simulations, voters’ skills are sampled uniformly in the range  ] 1 , 0 [ , 
subject to the single weak constraint that ∏ ∏ − >
ii
i i p p 1 . This constraint requires 
only that the probability that a unanimous decision is correct is greater than 1/2. 
For the first experiments, the number of issues is fixed and equal to 10 and 
100, respectively, while the number of voters varies from 1 to 1000. Accuracy results 
are tabulated over 10,000 independent trials (every trial represents a new choice of 
{pi} and {tj} and, hence, of a). As can be seen in Figure 1, the results remain almost 
constant for sufficiently large n. In particular, unlike in the standard Condorcet case 
and its extensions, SMR does not converge to accuracy of 1 as the number of voters 
increases. More significantly, for m = 10 and sufficiently large n, GF outperforms 
SMR by approximately 0.12 and the procedure Q outperforms GF by approximately 
0.03. Nevertheless, the limited number of issues prevents fine-grained approximation 
of the true {pi} values and even the Q procedure does not come close to the 
theoretical optimum. When the number of issues is increased to 100, we find that GF 
outperforms SMR by approximately 0.21 and the procedure Q outperforms GF by 
approximately 0.04, quickly reaching accuracy of 0.94.   16
 
Figure 1a:  [ ] 1 , 0 ~ , 10 U p m =  
 
Figure 1b:  [ ] 100, ~ 0,1 mp U =  
The next simulation presents the effect of the number of issues, varying this 
number from 1 to 1000. The number of voters is assumed to be constant equal to 5 
(Figure 2a) and 500 (Figure 2b) – representing committees and constituencies,   17
respectively. Since SMR is independent of the number of issues, its performance 
remains constant as m grows. As was already evident in Figures 1a and 1b, for both 
n=5 and n=500, it holds constant at approximately 0.69. By contrast, the accuracy of 
both the GF and Q procedures is positively affected by increasing m, due to the 
increased ability to estimate voters’ skills. Moreover, the greater the number of voters 
the greater the ability of the GF and Q procedures to leverage differential voter skills. 
                            
Figure 2a:  [ ] 1 , 0 ~ , 5 U p n =    18
                         
Figure 2b:  [ ] 1 , 0 ~ , 500 U p n =  
 
In each of the above cases, the voters’ skills parameters were sampled 
uniformly in the range [0,1], subject to the unanimity constraint. However, in many 
cases skills are normally distributed. In Figure 3, we show the results for Q, as in 
Figure 2b, comparing sampling of pi from a uniform distribution in [0,1] with 
sampling from a normal distribution (truncated with lower and upper bounds of 0 and 
1, respectively) with mean of ½ and a variety of variances. As might be expected, the 
greater the variance the faster the convergence as m increases, since Q is able to 
exploit the differences in skills to improve prediction. Note that a variance of 0.3 
yields slightly better results than the ones obtained under a uniform distribution.   19
 
Figure 3:  500 = n , p distribution varies as shown 
 
Recall that the key to procedure Q is its ability to find values of θ   that 
maximize the probability function  ) ; ( θ a p . To gauge the extent to which Q succeeds 
in maximizing this function, we compare the value of  ) ; ( θ a p using the value  * θ  
obtained by Q with the value of  ) ; ( t a p θ  using the true value  t θ  used to generate a. 
For the arbitrary parameter settings, m = 100 and n = 500, over 10,000 trials, we find 
that  ) ; ( * θ a p >) ; ( t a p θ  in 99.1% of the trials. This strongly suggests that Q is 
succeeding in finding global maxima in most cases. 
This begs the question of why the accuracy of Q falls short of that obtained 
where the true value of θ  is known. Note that for every assignment of probabilities, 
} { i p = θ , there is a dual assignment,  } 1 { i p − = θ , such that ) ; ( ) ; ( θ θ a p a p = . Thus, 
for every ``sensible" solution, θ , there is a counter-intuitive one, θ . Examination of 
the errors made by Q reveals that most of the errors are in trials for which the dual   20
solution of the true (actual) one is found. In these trials, every issue is assigned the 
wrong value. This systematic error occurs because of the weakness of our symmetry-
breaking assumption requiring that∏ ∏ − >
ii
i i p p 1 . When the difference between 
∏
i
i p  and ∏ −
i
i p 1  is small, a slight discrepancy in estimating the values of {pi} can 
result in the dual solution being chosen instead of the actual solution.  
The weakness of our assumption can be demonstrated empirically; it can be 
verified that if the pi values are chosen out of a uniform distribution in [0,1] subject 
solely to our assumption, then for every n the mean value of {pi},  i p , satisfies 
n
c
pi ≈ − 5 . 0 , where  2 . 0 ≈ c . It has been shown, however, by Berend and Paroush 
(1998) that a necessary (and sufficient) condition for Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to 
hold is that   Thus, by that result, Condorcet’s Jury 
Theorem does not hold for a skill distribution such as we consider here, a fact we 
have already noted empirically. It might, therefore, be of interest to consider a 
stronger symmetry-breaking assumption. 
 
5.  Simulation Results: Asymmetric Skill Distributions 
Consider now the case in which the {pi} values are chosen from a uniform 
distribution in [0.1,1] instead of in [0,1], which implies that there are no voters who 
are (almost) always wrong. In this case, the mean value of {pi} will typically be 
approximately 0.55. Figures 4a and 4b show the simulation results for m = 10 and m = 
100, respectively, as n varies. As can be seen, SMR converges to 1 as n grows. This is 
expected by an extension of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. Note, however, that even in 
this case, SMR is dominated by the Q procedure, which converges to accuracy of 1   21
considerably faster than SMR. 
 
Figure 4a:  [ ] 1 , 1 . 0 ~ , 10 U p m =  
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Figure 4b:  [ ] 1 , 1 . 0 ~ , 100 U p m =  
 
Finally, we re-examine the results presented in Figures 2a and 2b, by considering the 
uniform distribution in [0.1,1]. As in the case of the uniform distribution in [0,1], 
SMR is unaffected by increasing m. However, the accuracy of the GF and Q 
procedures increases with m, converging quite dramatically to near perfect accuracy 
in the case of n = 500. 
 
Figure 5a:  [ ] 1 , 1 . 0 ~ , 5 U p n =    23
 
Figure 5b:  [ ] 1 , 1 . 0 ~ , 500 U p n =  
To sum up, we find that our method is effective even under the most minimal 
assumption regarding voter skills: a unanimous vote must be more likely right than 
wrong. This assumption is considerably weaker than the voter skills assumption made 
by Condorcet and also weaker than the assumptions subsequently shown to be 
necessary and sufficient for the Condorcet Jury Theorem to hold (Berend and Paroush 
1998). Moreover, we have shown that the Q procedure outperforms GF and SMR 
both under sufficient skills assumptions where Condorcet’s Jury theorem holds and 
under our assumptions where it does not hold. 
 
 6. Conclusions 
This paper lies at the confluence of two fields: voting theory and stochastic 
optimization theory. The Q procedure is, as we have noted, an instantiation of the EM   24
algorithm, one of the best-known tools in stochastic optimization theory. The EM 
procedure is notably useful in data clustering, medicine, natural language processing, 
and a variety of other fields. It has been shown that the framework in which EM is 
used – optimizing values where information is missing – is appropriate to the problem 
of collective-decision making. In this case, the values to be optimized are estimations 
of voter skills and the missing information are the true outcomes. In short, EM can be 
profitably applied to the theory of voting and collective decision-making, where it can 
be used to achieve optimal resource utilization through maximum-likelihood 
experience-based estimation of the probabilities reflecting individual decisional skills 
and the assignment of the corresponding appropriate decisional weights. The 
proposed application of the EM procedure fills a significant gap in the literature on 
optimal collective judgment aggregation that was stimulated by Condorcet's (1785) 
approach and his celebrated jury theorem (Black 1958). When there are only some 
lower bounds on voters’ skills that do not differentiate among individual voters, 
Condorcet's Jury theorem deals with the optimal aggregation rule, namely, SMR. 
However, when information regarding the respective probabilities of individual 
voters’ making correct judgments is available, this additional information can be 
exploited through the optimal assignment of weights to individual voters according to 
their skills (Nitzan and Paroush 1982; Shapley and Grofman 1984). We have shown 
that optimization is possible even when the unrealistic assumption that voters’ skills 
are known does not hold. By our main results, when voters' decisions on a 
multiplicity of issues are known, there is no need to know the “correct” decision in 
order to estimate individual voter skills. It is thus possible to overcome the 
informational obstacle in optimal collective decision methods which can be invoked 
without making unrealistic demands for information. This brings the generalization of   25
Condorcet's approach to a “happy end”: the optimal rule is identifiable even under 
common circumstances. 
Note that in Condorcet's setting, the maximum likelihood estimation is applied 
to the likelihood of their single observed set of judgments relative to the two 
(unobserved) states of the world, assuming that voters' decisional skills are equal. 
From these estimated likelihoods, we infer that the most likely state is the one that 
would have produced the observation with the higher probability (Young 1988, 1995). 
The same approach is used in the more general settings of Condorcet's followers, 
making alternative assumptions on the voters' decisional skills. In our more general 
setting, the maximum likelihood estimation is applied given the observed judgments 
of the voters on m issues. The estimation consists of two stages. In the first stage, the 
unobserved voters' decisional skills are estimated and in the second stage, the 
likelihood of their single, m
th observed set of judgments is estimated in the two 
(unobserved) states of the world, assuming that voters' probabilities to make the 
correct decision are those obtained in the first stage. From these estimated likelihoods 
we infer that the most likely state is the one that would have produced the m
th 
observation with the higher probability. 
The situation in which voter decisions on multiple issues are available is a 
common one both in the context of voting and in the context of expert judgments. 
Although the natural setting for our approach is 
the one in which voting is "a collective quest for truth" (Young 
1995), we can also apply our algorithm to cases in which voting is "a 
compromise between conflicting values" (Young 1995), that is, where we 
wish to reach consensus among voters whose individual preferences are 
expressed by approving or rejecting each of a multiplicity of   26
proposals or candidates. Thus, for example, every instance in which voters are asked 
to simultaneously approve or reject each of a multiplicity of proposals or candidates 
is amenable to the analysis presented here and to the application of the proposed 
optimal aggregation method based on the Q procedure. This is the balloting method 
used in approval voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 2005), in which the object is to 
determine some set of winners when voters' dichotomous preferences are defined on 
the set of alternative candidates. Thus, like Brams et al. (2007), we are, in effect, 
proposing an alternative aggregation function for the approval voting balloting 
method. In this context, however, the fact that 
voters are assigned different weights, and that some might even be 
assigned negative weights, plainly runs into political, institutional, 
structural, psychological and cultural difficulties.  
 
Similarly, this method can be used in voting bodies, such as parliaments, 
where open voting takes place on a regular basis. Moreover, the use of the Internet for 
assembling positive or negative user judgments on products has become 
commonplace. The Q procedure can be used to optimally aggregate these individual 
judgments into an optimal overall judgment. More broadly, the method is applicable 
wherever ongoing decisions are required in uncertain dichotomous choice settings, in 
legal, medical, economic, political (Miller 1996) and other contexts.   27
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